I väntan på Jesus

 

 

 

 

 

If oil consumption rises with a higher percentage than oil production, then the volume of oil export is declining with time, and exponentially so, i.e. with an accelerated decline rate. OK. Has the oil consumption in the world risen with a higher percentage than oil production since 2005? Answer: YES. The global GDP growth during the years 2000-2019 has been 3,8 % annually, on average. And this pertains also to the period 2005-2024  

 

"However, the global growth is historically low, the average global GDP of the years 2000-2019 was 3.8%." (From this article)

 

 

Maybe the average real economic growth since 2005, taking into account inflation and debt and "The Everything Bubble", is only 1,5 % annually. Ecological economist Tim Morgan has thought in this direction, but his GDP numbers for the real economy are not so low as mine, I think I remember. 

 

This, 1,5 %, aligns more with the growth in oil production since 2005.

"In 2023, global crude oil production slowed to +1%, aligning with its 2010-2019 average..." (From this article)

 

In 2005 "All Liquids" oil production was, globally, at about 85 mbd. See the following chart: 

 

 

 

 

(Chart from this article 2020)

 

Since that, "All Liquids" oil has, in 20 years, risen with only 15-20 mbd (9 mbd of this volume has been shale oil in the US, see this article), which is not even a 1 % rise per year, which translates to 1 mbd of rising oil production per year. Most of this has been shale oil, oil sands, NGL (Natural Gas Liquids), biofuels and refinery gains. Even if it had been a 30 mbd rise in 20 years, it's only a rise of 1,5 % annually. It's 1,5 mbd per year, which is less than half of the GDP rise of 3,8%, in percentages. Global net oil exports have thus to have been falling all the way since 2005, and exponentially so, i.e. with an accelerated rate of decline. The chart that famous oil geologist Art Berman shared on Twitter here, with BP statistical review data, is thus FALSE!!!. In that chart global oil exports peaked in 2016 at 71 mbd, and has declined since, to 68 mbd in 2023. Brown said, as you already know, that conventional oil exports (perhaps minus condensate) peaked in 2005 at 46 mbd and has declined since with an accelerated rate of decline. With his data, also "All Liquids" oil exports should have been declining since 2005.   

 

 

If the economy grows faster than the oil production, we are tanking the future, borrowing from the future, which one can do also with oil, in the oil context, not only with debt in our financial economy. This means that our oil reserves are rapidly dwindling, and that global net oil exports (according to the Export Land Model) are declining exponentially, i.e. with an accelerated rate of decline. Oil production only need to grow a little less (just 0.001% less) than our oil consumption rises, in percentages, in order for the following to happen: that our oil exports decline at an accelerated rate, i.e. exponentially.

 

If our global oil production rises 1 % annually, and our global oil consumption rises 1,5 % annually, our global net oil exports fall at a steep accelerated rate. 

 

If global oil production has risen with 0,9% annually since 2005, and oil consumption has risen with 1,9 % annually since then, yes then this fits with what Jeffrey J. Brown said in this article 2008 (1) that since 2006-2007 the global oil exports in "the top five" oil exporting countries declines with 1 mbd per year, on average, for the time period 2005-2030. 

 

 

 

In an email exchange I had with learned Peak Oil expert Steve St. Angelo, Steve said that the field of oil export math changed when the shale oil boom started, and that we cannot trust Brown any more, that he did not take the shale oil boom into account. Then I want to state the following facts as important in order to be able to understand the timing of the predictions of this book:

 

A) That Jeffrey J. Brown lives in Texas and was well informed about the shale oil industry already in August 2015, when Chris Martenson had his very important interview with Brown, when Brown said those things about the end of "ANE oil" in 2032. 

 

B) That Jeffrey J. Brown calculated with conventional numbers about the oil reserves, in 2015, that Jefferson/Patterson's articles about these, which stated that we only had half as much in our oil reserves, came so late that Brown could not have read them before Martensons interview with Brown in 2015. The fact is that Patterson wrote his fateful article about the oil reserves in 2016, and Jefferson published his fateful paper only a few weeks before Martenson's interview. Jefferson's article was behind a paywall, which minimizes the risk that Brown read it before Martenson's interview. Brown had also mentioned Jefferson's article or Jefferson's thesis at large, if he had read it or heard about it before the interview. Brown's statements in 2013 excludes the possibility that he had read Jefferson's article. He said in 2013 that the end of "ANE oil" would come in 2030, theoretically. He could then have added two years to the 2013 prediction in 2015 because of the shale oil boom, which was really taking off. If he had taken Jefferson's thesis into account, he should have said, in the interview in 2015, that the end of ANE would come in 2027-2028, not in 2032, i.e. he would have made a more radical prediction, not added a few years to the prediction. 

 

If BP statistical review data about our oil reserves are correct, then Brown's calculations about the end of global oil exports in 2032, could be right, but I think we have only half as much, so that 2027-2028 is a more likely date for it. I.e. Jefferson/Patterson/Dietrich (James Dietrich wrote this fateful book 2019 about our oil reserves) are probably right, so that "Crash Watcher's" 2027 date is more likely to be the right than Brown's date. We lose at least four-five years to this. 

 

C) That Brown calculated with BP statistical review data when he came to the conclusion that "ANE oil" would theoretically end in 2030 (observe that he said this in this article 18.2.2013, (2)). Brown could have taken into account both BP's projections about coming oil production and its estimates about the global oil reserves. He has to have calculated with BP data, because he never mentions other data sources (only once EIA) in his writings on the internet. Only in 2013 he mentioned that he used BP and EIA data, in this article, as far as I know. BP and EIA data are "corporate and government, official" data, which are often very optimistic. 

 

D) What Brown said in Martenson's interview with him in 2017, when nobody could deny the gigantic scope of the shale oil boom and its potential (3). Especially when we take into account that Brown lives in Texas, where the Permian shale play is, more specifically in Dallas/Forth Worth. Brown did not change his predictions in this interview, which also was about oil exports. He lived close to the area where the biggest shale oil play was, the Permian in Texas! Very prophetic! And how could someone say that Brown did not take the shale oil boom into account when this was the case? He lived in Dallas/Forth Worth, which is near the great shale oil play Eagle Ford, which was very big and popular around 2010, yes even up into 2015 (when it peaked). It was the next biggest shale oil play after the Permian. 2017 the shale oil boom had continued for 10 years!!

 

E) Actually it does not matter if Jeffrey J. Brown meant "All Liquids", "Crude + Condensate" or "Crude minus condensate"/"Conventional crude minus condensate" with his numbers 46 mbd as the peak in 2005 and the 30 mbd in 2021. All these oils end anyway about at the same time, think about it in this way: The diesel one gets out of an oil barrel is exhausted about at the same time as the gasoline one gets out of it, and vice versa. Yes, at the same time as all the rest of the oil products one gets out of it; butane, propane, and so on, are exhausted. And actually, for all practical purposes, it is the conventional crude minus condensate, or the diesel, which really counts here, and it is first exhausted. The diesel ends first, because it is in that part of oil that ends first, i.e. conventional crude minus condensate. What does all unconventional oil and all condensate help us if we only can get small amounts of diesel out of it to our heavy transportation? And when diesel ends, everything ends, in civilization. Remember the "global diesel shortage" in 2022-2023. 

 

 

 

 

The volume of the global transactions have declined since 2021, with on average 0,9 % per month!! So according to an article on August 1, 2024 in Dagens Industri, a Swedish financial newspaper. And the pace is accelerating. But if we take 0,9 % per month and project it linearly upon the future, the volume of transactions reaches zero in a little more than six years, in the end of 2030. It could mean that the global trade stops completely in 2030, with that pace. And this is a linear scenario. The reality is exponential here. 

 

Since the pace of decline is accelerating, in the beginning, since 2021, the global transaction volumes could have started their decline with a 0,5 % per month in 2021 (but with an average of 0,9 % over the whole period), and ended in 2024 with 1,8 % per month. It fits to some degree with my calculations that in 2024 overall oil exports declines with about 440 000 bd per month. 1,8 % of 20 mbd (which was, at most, what we had/have in 2023-2024) is namely about 0,36 (360 000 bd per month, only 80 000 bd less than 440 000 bd). Notice that the volume of global transactions is tightly linked to oil consumption. 

 

 

 

 

 

 (1) From the summary of the article (Brown builds upon BP data): 

 

"Our middle case shows Saudi Arabia approaching zero net exports in 2031, within a range from 2024 to 2037"  (Observe: This was with BP:s optimistic, idealized data. Mind also the bank Citigroup's prediction that 2030 will be the end of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves, see this article from 2012. My remark)

"Our middle case forecast is that the top five net oil exporting countries, accounting for about half of world net oil exports, will approach zero net oil exports around 2031—going from peak net exports to zero in about 26 years, versus seven years and eight years respectively for the UK and Indonesia. In our opinion, the only real difference between the top five and the UK and Indonesia is that the top five net exporters in 2005 had a lower rate of consumption relative to production.

Extrapolating from year to date 2007 data, it appears likely that the top five will show an average aggregate net export decline of about one mbpd per year in both 2006 and 2007, putting them on track to go from about 23 mbpd in net exports in 2005 to close to zero in the 2030 time frame." (Observe that this projection is linear, see this "one mbpd per year". If one makes an exponential calculation, one easily comes to 2025-2027. My remark)

 

(2) Then the shale oil boom had continued for 5-6 years, since 2007-2008. 2015 it had continued for 7-8 years, and Brown lived where the expectations were highest!

 

(3) Then (in 2017) the shale oil boom had continued for a whopping 10 years. Observe that Brown had not changed his calculations in these 10 years, by much. Still clearer this issue gets when one contemplates that he did not even change his calculations after 14 years of shale oil boom, in his statement in the article in 2021 that we had 30 mbd of oil exports left. Should we seriously believe that Brown did not take the shale oil boom into account in his calculations as late as in October 2021? When he came up with those 30 mbd? He who lived in the midst of the shale oil boom? This is completely unthinkable. Probably he believed also in 2021 in 2032 as the end of "ANE oil". 

 

 

 

Epilogue

 

My dear readers.